Caspar "Cap" Willard Weinberger (18 August 1917 - 28 March 2006) was Secretary of Defense during the period when U.S. troops landed on Grenada's soil. Contrary to assumptions, Defense Secretary Weinberger was hesitant and systematically careful not to rush into Grenada by sending in the troops.

In an online interview sponsored by George Washington University, Weinberger says his worst moment on his watch as Defense Secretary was the bombing of the barracks at the Beirut, Lebanon airport and the loss of 250 Marines on Saturday night into the Sunday of 23 October 1983.

Weinberger continues in the same vein on 19 November 2002 during an interview for the Reagan Oral History Project - "I was not persuasive enough to convince the President that the Marines were there on an impossible mission."

U.S. troops landed in Grenada in the pre-dawn hours of Tuesday 25 October 1983, though movement preparation occurred the night of Monday 24 October.

Even though extensive preparations and contingency plans to send troops to Grenada had been made previous to the Beirut bombing, some prior to the massacre at Fort Rupert of 19 October, a National Security Decision Directive [NSDD] was signed by President Reagan the evening of the day of the Beirut bombing. The NSDD gave the orders for 'Operation Urgent Fury' to proceed. Still, everyone was holding on for a final decision on the safety of U.S. citizens.

. . . what was the reason for the US invasion of Grenada in 1983? . . we had clear evidence, borne out by the captured weapons later on, that the Soviets were, through Cuba, making every effort to establish a base, building runways and air facilities far beyond anything needed to attract tourists.

We had a further major interest in the sense that there were closee to 1,000 American students at a medical school there, who were in very substantial peril. Their Dean who was safe in Brooklyn kept saying there was no danger, but the students didn't feel that way and we didn't want another Iran, we didn't want hundreds of Americans taken prisoners by what amounted to a totally anarchistic group.

Weinberger was Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan from 21 January 1981 until 23 November 1987. His 1990 book, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon with a chapter on Grenada. In that book, Weinberger writes:

On October 20, the day after Bishop was murdered, I approved General Vessey's recommendation that we turn southward two units—the carrier Independence and its Battle Group, and the Marine replacement group that was then under way for normal rotation with units in the Lebanon area—in case they would be needed near Grenada.

We also, of course, had our alert battalions and alert airborne division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Campbell, South Carolina, which were ready at all times for anything the President might call upon them to do.

Weinberger was in attendance in all major meetings before and during the invasion. Accompanying him was General Vessy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their hestation concerning 'Operation Urgent Fury' was because they felt there was not enough intelligence about Grenada, including weapons on Grenada and the role of the Cubans. As a consequence of this concern, Weinberger made a decision to double the total force.

"The presidential decision came down finally, the final meeting was on Monday night, October 24th, about five or six o'clock.

The meeting took place in the Situation Room in the White House, with the president in the chair.

Present were the

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, National Security Advisors, two or three or four more

Each one of them gave their appropriate briefings, there were some questions raised by some of the members, exploratory, not aggressive type of questions.

To the point.

The president asked, made a couple of questions himself, the president then asked if there were any other questions, any other comments and there ensued a silence that probably lasted thirty seconds but to me lasted like five minutes.

Because in the final analysis, it's the president that has to make that decision.

And after this silence, he said,

'O.K., let's go.'

Weinberger's public and private life was a full one. For purposes of this website concentration is on his role in relation to Grenada. Weinberger was open to extensive interviewing, composed articles, gave speeches and wrote books during his long career in government

It is interesting to speculate WHAT IFs? Recall that Reagan had commandeered orders to a reluctant Weinberger to change the Marines from a peacekeeping force to a combat one. According to Sloyan:

The defense chief [Caspar Weinberger] requested the withdrawal of the Marines [back aboard ships just offshore] from Beirut during a White House meeting five days before [on 10/23/83] a smiling suicide driver roared past guards with a truck carrying 12,000 pounds of high explosives.

Weinherger's request was denied. Two days later, 48 hours of the bombing in Beirut, Reagan et al authorized the first of 5,000 American troops to Grenada.